[1028a] [10]
The term "being" has several senses,which we have classified in our discussion1 of the number of senses in which terms areused. It denotes first the " what " of a thing, i.e. theindividuality; and then the quality or quantity or any other suchcategory. Now of all these senses which "being" has, the primary senseis clearly the "what," which denotes the substance(because when we describethe quality of a particular thing we say that it is "good or bad," andnot "five feet high" or "a man"; but when we describewhat it is, we say not that it is "white" or "hot" or"five feet high," but that it is "a man" or "a god"), and all otherthings are said to "be" because they are either quantities orqualities or affections or some other such thing.
[20] Hence one mightraise the question whether the terms "to walk" and "to be well" and"to sit" signify each of these things as "being," or not; andsimilarly in the case of any other such terms; for not one of them bynature has an independent existence or can be separated from itssubstance. Rather, if anything it is the thing whichwalks or sits or is well that is existent.The reason why these things are more trulyexistent is because their subject is something definite; i.e. thesubstance and the individual, which is clearly implied in adesignation of this kind, since apart from it we cannot speak of "thegood" or "sitting." Clearly then it is by reason of the substance thateach of the things referred to exists.Hence that which is primarily,not in a qualified sense but absolutely, will be substance.
Now "primary" has several meanings; butnevertheless substance is primary in all senses, both in definitionand in knowledge and in time. For none of the other categories canexist separately, but substance alone;and it is primary also in definition, becausein the formula of each thing the formula of substance must beinherent; and we assume that we know each particular thing most trulywhen we know what "man" or "fire" is— [1028b] [1] rather than its quality or quantity orposition; because we know each of these points too when we knowwhat the quantity or quality is.Indeed, the question which was raisedlong ago, is still and always will be, and which always bafflesus—"What is Being?"—is in other words "What issubstance?" Some say that it is one2; others, morethan one; some, finite3; others, infinite.4 And so for us too our chief and primary andpractically our only concern is to investigate the nature of "being"in the sense of substance.
Substance is thought to bepresent most obviously in bodies. Hence we call animals and plants andtheir parts substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water,earth, etc., and all things which are parts of these or composed ofthese, either of parts or them or of their totality; e.g. the visibleuniverse and its parts, the stars and moon and sun.We must consider whether (a) these arethe only substances, or (b) these and some others, or (c) some ofthese, or (d) some of these and some others, or (e) none of these, butcertain others. Some5 hold that the bounds of body—i.e.the surface, line, point and unit—are substances, and in atruer sense than body or the solid.Again, some6 believe that there isnothing of this kind besides sensible things, while others believe ineternal entities more numerous and more real than sensiblethings. [20] Thus Platoposited the Forms and the objects of mathematics as two kinds ofsubstance, and as a third the substance of sensible bodies;and Speusippus7 assumed still more kinds ofsubstances, starting with "the One," and positing principles for eachkind: one for numbers, another for magnitudes, and then another forthe soul. In this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. Some8 again hold that the Forms andnumbers have the same nature, and that other things—linesand planes—are dependent upon them; and soon back to thesubstance of the visible universe and sensible things.We must consider, then, withregard to these matters, which of the views expressed is right andwhich wrong; and what things are substances; and whether there are anysubstances besides the sensible substances, or not; and how sensiblesubstances exist; and whether there is any separable substance (and ifso, why and how) or no substance besides the sensible ones. We mustfirst give a rough sketch of what substance is.
Theterm "substance" is used, if not in more, at least in four principalcases; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are heldto be the substance of the particular, and fourthly the substrate. Thesubstrate is that of which the rest are predicated, while it is notit*elf predicated of anything else. Hence we must first determine itsnature, [1029a] [1] for the primary substrate is consideredto be in the truest sense substance.
Now in one sensewe call the matter the substrate; in another, theshape ; and in a third, the combination of the two.By matter I mean, for instance, bronze; by shape, the arrangement ofthe form; and by the combination of the two, the concrete thing: thestatue. Thus if the form is prior to the matter and more trulyexistent, by the same argument it will also be prior to thecombination.
We have now stated in outline thenature of substance—that it is not that which is predicatedof a subject, but that of which the other things are predicated. Butwe must not merely define it so, for it is not enough. Not only is thestatement itself obscure, but also it makes matter substance; for ifmatter is not substance, it is beyond our power to say what elseis.For wheneverything else is removed, clearly nothing but matter remains;because all the other things are affections, products and potencies ofbodies, and length, breadth and depth are kinds of quantity, and notsubstances. For quantity is not a substance; rather the substance isthat to which these affections primarily belong.But when we take away length andbreadth and depth we can see no thing remaining, unless it be thesomething bounded by them; so that on this view matter must appear tobe the only substance. [20] Bymatter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor aquantity nor designated by any of the categories which defineBeing.For there issomething of which each of these is predicated, whose being isdifferent from that of each one of the categories; because all otherthings are predicated of substance, but this is predicated of matter.Thus the ultimate substrate is in itself neither a particular thingnor a quantity nor anything else. Nor indeed is it the negations ofthese; for the negations too will only apply to itaccidentally.
If we hold this view, it follows thatmatter is substance. But this is impossible; for it is accepted thatseparability and individuality belong especially to substance. Henceit would seem that the form and the combination of form and matter aremore truly substance than matter is.The substance, then, which consists ofboth—I mean of matter and form—may be dismissed,since it is posterior and obvious. Matter too is in a sense evident.We must consider the third type, for this is the mostperplexing.
Now it is agreed thatsome sensible things are substances, and so we should begin ourinquiry in connection with these. [1029b] [1] It is convenient to advance to the moreintelligible9; for learning is always acquiredin this way, by advancing through what is less intelligible by natureto what is more so. And just as in actions it is our task to startfrom the good of the individual and make absolute good good for theindividual,10 so it is ourtask to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make whatis by nature intelligible intelligible to oneself.Now that which is intelligible andprimary to individuals is often but slightly intelligible, andcontains but little reality; but nevertheless, starting from thatwhich is imperfectly intelligible but intelligible to oneself, we musttry to understand the absolutely intelligible; advancing, as we havesaid, by means of these very things which are intelligible tous.
Since we distinguished at thebeginning11 the number of ways inwhich substance is defined, and since one of these appeared to beessence, we must investigate this.First, let us make certain linguisticstatements about it.
The essence of eachthing is that which it is said to be per se. "To be you" is not "to becultured," because you are not of your own nature cultured. Youressence, then, is that which you are said to be
of your own nature. But not even all of this is theessence; for the essence is not that which is said to be per se in thesense that whiteness is said to belong to a surface,12 because "being a surface" is not"being white."Nor is theessence the combination of both, "being a white surface." Why? Becausethe word itself is repeated. [20] Hence the formula of the essence of each thing is that which definesthe term but does not contain it. Thus if "being a white surface" isthe same as "being a smooth surface," "white" and "smooth" are one andthe same.13
But since in the othercategories too there are compounds with substance (because there is asubstrate for each category, e.g. quality, quantity, time, place andmotion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence ofeach one of them; whether these compounds, e.g. "white man," also havean essence. Let the compound be denoted by X.14What is the essence of X?
"But this isnot even a per se expression." We reply that there are two ways inwhich a definition can be not per se true of its subject: (a) by anaddition, and (b) by an omission.In one case the definition is not per se truebecause the term which is being defined is combined with somethingelse; as if, e.g., in defining whiteness one were to state thedefinition of a white man. In the other, because something else (whichis not in the definition) is combined with the subject; as if, e.g., Xwere to denote "white man," and X were defined as "white." "White man"is white, [1030a] [1] but its essence is not "to be white."But is "to be X" an essence at all?Surely not. The essence is an individual type;but when a subject has something distinct from it predicated of it, itis not an individual type. E.g., "white man" is not an individualtype; that is, assuming that individuality belongs only to substances.Hence essence belongs to all things the account of which is adefinition.We havea definition, not if the name and the account signify the same (forthen all accounts would be definitions; because any account can have aname, so that even "the Iliad " will be a definition),but if the account is of something primary. Such are all statementswhich do not involve the predication of one thing ofanother.Henceessence will belong to nothing except species of a genus, but to theseonly; for in these the predicate is not considered to be related tothe subject by participation or affection, nor as an accident. But ofeverything else as well, if it has a name, there will be a formula ofwhat it means—that X belongs to Y; orinstead of a simple formula one more exact—but nodefinition, nor essence.
Or perhaps "definition," likethe "what," has more than one sense. For the "what" in one sense meansthe substance and the individual, [20] and in another each one of the categories:quantity, quality, etc.Just as "is" applies to everything, although not in the same way,but primarily to one thing and secondarily to others; so "what it is"applies in an unqualified sense to substance, and to other things in aqualified sense. For we might ask also what quality "is," so thatquality also is a "what it is"; not however without qualification, butjust as in the case of not-being some say by a verbal quibble thatnot-being "is"—not in an unqualified sense, but "is"not-being—so too with quality.
Now although wemust also consider how we should express ourselves in each particularcase, it is still more important to consider what the facts are. Hencenow, since the language which we are using is clear, similarly essencealso will belong primarily and simply to substance, and secondarily toother things as well; just as the "what it is" is not essence simply,but the essence of a quality or quantity.For it must be either by equivocation that wesay that these things are , or by adding and subtractingqualifications, as we say that the unknowable is known15;since the truth is that we use the terms neither equivocally nor inthe same sense, but just as we use the term "medical" inrelation to one and the same thing; [1030b] [1] but not of one and the same thing, noryet equivocally. The term "medical" is applied to a body and afunction and an instrument, neither equivocally nor in one sense, hutin relation to one thing.16
However, in whichever way one chooses to speak of these things, itmatters nothing; but this point is clear: that the primary andunqualified definition, and the essence, belong to substances. It istrue that they belong equally to other things too, but notprimarily . For if we assume this, it does notnecessarily follow that there is a definition of anything which meansthe same as any formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind offormula, i.e. the formula of one thing—one not by continuity like the
Iliad, or things which are arbitrarily combined,but in one of the proper senses of "one." And "one" has the samevariety of senses as "being." "Being" means sometimes the individualthing, sometimes the quantity, sometimes the quality. Hence even"white man" will have a formula and definition; but in a differentsense from the definition of "whiteness" and "substance."
The question arises: If one denies that a formula involving an addeddeterminant is a definition, how can there be a definition of termswhich are not simple but coupled? Because they can only be explainedby adding a determinant.Imean, e.g., there is "nose" and "concavity" and "snubness," the termcompounded of the two, because the one is present in the other.Neither "concavity" nor "snubness" is an accidental, but a per seaffection of the nose.17 [20] Nor are they attributes in the sense that "white"is of Callias or a man, because Callias is white and is by accident aman; but in the sense that "male" is an attribute of animal, andequality of quantity, and all other attributes which we say belong perse.That is, allthings which involve the formula or name of the subject of theaffection, and cannot be explained apart from it. Thus "white" can beexplained apart from "man," but not "female" apart from "animal." Thuseither these terms have no essence or definition, or else they have itin a different sense, as we have said.
But there is alsoanother difficulty about them. If "snub nose" is the same as "concavenose," "snub" will be the same as "concave." But if not, since it isimpossible to speak of "snub" apart from the thing of which it is aper se affection (because "snub" means a concavity in the nose),either it is impossible to call the nose snub, or it will be atautology, "concave-nose nose" because "snub nose" will equal"concave-nose nose."Henceit is absurd that such terms as these should have an essence.Otherwise there will be an infinite regression; for in "snub-nosenose" there will be yet another nose. [1031a] [1] Clearly, then, there is definition of substance alone. If there weredefinition of the other categories also, it would have to involve anadded determinant, as in the case of the qualitative; and of the odd,for this cannot be defined apart from number; nor can "female" apartfrom "animal."By"involving an added determinant" I mean descriptions which involve atautology, as in the above examples. Now if this is true, there willbe no definition of compound expressions either; e.g., "odd number."We fail to realize this because our terms are not used accurately. Ifon the other hand there are definitions of these too, either they aredefined in a different way, or, as we have said, "definition" and"essence" must be used in more than one sense;thus in one sense there will be nodefinition of anything, and nothing will have an essence, exceptsubstances; and in another those other things will have a definitionand essence. It is obvious, then, that the definition is the formulaof the essence, and that the essence belongs either onlyto substances, or especially and primarily and simply.
We must inquire whether the essence is the same as the particularthing, or different. This is useful for our inquiry about substance;because a particular thing is considered to be nothing other than itsown substance, and the essence is called the substance of thething.In accidentalpredications, indeed, the thing itself would seem to be different fromits essence; [20] e.g., "whiteman" is different from "essence of white man." If it were the same,"essence of man" and "essence of white man" would be the same. For"man" and "white man" are the same, they say, and therefore "essenceof white man" is the same as "essence of man."But perhaps it is not necessarily truethat the essence of accidental combinations is the same as that of thesimple terms; because the extremes of the syllogism are not identicalwith the middle term in the same way.18 Perhaps it might be thought to follow thatthe accidental extremes are identical; e.g. "essence of white" and"essence of cultured"; but this is not admitted.19
But inper se expressions, is the thing necessarily the same as its essence,e.g., if there are substances which have no other substances orentities prior to them, such as some hold the Ideas to be?For if the Ideal Good is to bedifferent from the essence of good, and the Ideal Animal and Beingfrom the essence of animal and being, [1031b] [1] therewill be other substances and entities and Ideas besides the ones whichthey describe; and prior to them, if essence is substance. And if theyare separate from each other, there will be no knowledge of the Ideas,and the essences will not exist(by "being separate" I mean if neither theessence of good is present in the Ideal Good, nor "being good" in theessence of good); for it is when we know the essence of it that wehave knowledge of a thing. And it is the same with other essences aswith the essence of good; so that if the essence of good is not good,neither will the essence of being "be," nor the essence of one beone.Either allessences exist alike, or none of them; and so if not even the essenceof being "is," neither will any other essence exist. Again that towhich "essentially good" does not apply cannot be good. Hence "thegood" must be one with the essence of good, "the beautiful" with theessence of beauty, and so with all terms which are not dependent uponsomething else, but self-subsistent and primary.20For it is enough if this is so, even if theyare not Forms; or perhaps rather even if they are. (At the same timeit is clear also that if the Ideas are such as some hold, thesubstrate will not be substance; for the Ideas must be substances, butnot involving a substrate, because if they did involve one they wouldexist in virtue of its participation in them.)21
That each individual thing isone and the same with its essence, and not merely accidentallyso, [20] is apparent, notonly from the foregoing considerations, but because to have knowledgeof the individual is to have knowledge of its essence; so that bysetting out examples it is evident that both must beidentical.But asfor the accidental term, e.g. "cultured" or "white," since it has twomeanings, it is not true to say that the term itself is the same asits essence; for both the accidental term and that of which it is anaccident are "white," so that in one sense the essence and the termitself are the same, and in another they are not, because the essenceis not the same as "the man" or "the white man," but it is the same asthe affection.
The absurdity <of separating athing from its essence> will be apparent also if one supplies aname for each essence; for then there will be another essence besidesthe original one, e.g. the essence of "horse" will have a furtheressence. Yet why should not some things be identified with theiressence from the outset,22if essence is substance? Indeed not only are the thing and its essenceone, but their formula is the same, [1032a] [1] as isclear from what we have just stated; for it is not by accident thatthe essence of "one," and "the one," are one.Moreover, if they are different, therewill be an infinite series; for the essence of "one" and "the one"will both exist; so that in that case too the same principle willapply.23 Clearly, then, in the case ofprimary and self-subsistent terms, the individual thing and itsessence are one and the same.
It is obvious that thesophistical objections to this thesis are met in the same way as thequestion whether Socrates isthe same as the essence of Socrates; for there is no difference either in thegrounds for asking the question or in the means of meeting itsuccessfully. We have now explained in what sense the essence is, andin what sense it is not, the same as the individual thing.
Of things which are generated, some are generated naturally, othersartificially, and others spontaneously; but everything which isgenerated is generated by something and from something and becomessomething. When I say "becomes something" I mean in any of thecategories; it may come to be either a particular thing or of somequantity or quality or in some place.
Natural generation is the generation of things whose generation isby nature.That from whichthey are generated is what we call matter; that by which, is somethingwhich exists naturally; and that which they become is a man or a plantor something else of this kind, which we call substance in the highestdegree. [20] All thingswhich are generated naturally or artificially have matter; for it ispossible for each one of them both to be and not to be, and thispossibility is the matter in each individual thing.And in general both that from which andthat in accordance with which they are generated, is nature; for thething generated, e.g. plant or animal, has a nature. And that by whichthey are generated is the so-called "formal" nature, which has thesame form as the thing generated (although it is in something else);for man begets man.
Such is thegeneration of things which are naturally generated; the other kinds ofgeneration are called productions. All productions proceed from eitherart or potency or thought.Some of them are also generated spontaneously and by chance in muchthe same way as things which are naturally generated; for sometimeseven in the sphere of nature the same things are generated both fromseed and without it.24We shall consider cases of this kind later.25 [1032b] [1] Things are generated artificially whose form iscontained in the soul (by "form" I mean the essence of each thing, andits primary substance);foreven contraries have in a sense the same form.26 For the substance of theprivation is the opposite substance; e.g., health is the substance ofdisease; for disease is the absence of health, and health is theformula and knowledge in the soul. Now the healthy subject is producedas the result of this reasoning: since health is so-and-so, if thesubject is to be healthy, it must have such-and-such a quality, e.g.hom*ogeneity; and if so, it must have heat.And the physician continues reasoning until hearrives at what he himself finally can do; then the process from thispoint onwards, i.e. the process towards health, is called"production." Therefore it follows in a sense that health comes fromhealth and a house from a house; that which has matter from that whichhas not (for the art of medicine or of building is theform of health or the house). By substance without matterI mean the essence.
In generations and motions part of theprocess is called cogitation, and part production—that whichproceeds from the starting-point and the form is cogitation, and thatwhich proceeds from the conclusion of the cogitation is production.Each of the other intermediate measures is carried out in the sameway. I mean, e.g., that if A is to be healthy, his physical conditionwill have to be made uniform. What, then, does being made uniformentail? So-and-so; [20] and thiswill be achieved if he is made hot. What does this entail? So-and-so;now this is potentially present, and the thing is now in hispower.
The thing which produces, and from which theprocess of recovering health begins, is the form in the soul, if theprocess is artificial; if spontaneous, it is whatever is thestarting-point of the production for the artificial producer; as inmedical treatment the starting-point is, perhaps, the heating of thepatient; and this the doctor produces by friction. Heat in the body,then, is either a part of health, or is followed (directly or throughseveral intermediaries) by something similar which is a part ofhealth. This is the ultimate thing, namely that produces, and in thissense is a part of, health—or of the house (in the form of stones)27 or of other things. Therefore, as we say,generation would be impossible if nothing were already existent. It isclear, then, that some part must necessarily pre-exist; because thematter is a part, since it is matter which pre-exists in the productand becomes something. [1033a] [1] But then is matter part of theformula? Well, we define bronze circles in both ways; we describe thematter as bronze, and the form as such-and-such a shape; and thisshape is the proximate genus in which the circle is placed.The bronze circle, then, hasits matter in its formula. Now as for that from which, as matter,things are generated, some things when they are generated are callednot "so-and-so," but "made of so-and-so"; e.g., a statue is not calledstone, but made of stone. But the man who becomes healthy is notcalled after that from which he becomes healthy. This is because thegeneration proceeds from the privation and the substrate, which wecall matter (e.g., both "the man" and "the invalid" becomehealthy),but it ismore properly said to proceed from the privation; e.g., a man becomeshealthy from being an invalid rather than from being a man. Hence ahealthy person is not called an invalid, but a man, and a healthy man.But where the privation is obscure and has no name—e.g. inbronze the privation of any given shape, or in bricks and wood theprivation of the shape of a house—the generation isconsidered to proceed from these materials, as in the former case fromthe invalid.Hence just asin the former case the subject is not called that from which it isgenerated, so in this case the statue is not called wood, but iscalled by a verbal change not wood, but wooden; not bronze, but madeof bronze; not stone, but made of stone; and the house is called notbricks, but made of bricks. [20] For if we consider the matter carefully, we should not even saywithout qualification that a statue is generated from wood, or a housefrom bricks; because that from which a thing is generated should notpersist, but be changed. This, then, is why we speak in thisway.
Now since that which is generated is generatedby something (by which I mean the starting-point ofthe process of generation), and from something (by whichlet us understand not the privation but the matter; for we havealready distinguished the meanings of these), and becomessomething (i.e. a sphere or circle or whatever else it may be); justas the craftsman does not produce the substrate, i.e. the bronze, soneither does he produce the sphere; except accidentally, inasmuch asthe bronze sphere is a sphere, and he makes the former.For to make an individual thingis to make it out of the substrate in the fullest sense. I mean thatto make the bronze round is not to make the round or the sphere, butsomething else; i.e. to produce this form in another medium. For if wemake the form, we must make it out of something else; for this hasbeen assumed. [1033b] [1] E.g., we make a bronze sphere; we dothis in the sense that from A, i.e. bronze, we make B, i.e. asphere.If, then, wemake the spherical form itself, clearly we shall have to make it inthe same way; and the processes of generation will continue toinfinity.
It is therefore obviousthat the form (or whatever we should call the shape in the sensiblething) is not generated—generation does not apply toit— nor is the essence generated; for this is that which isinduced in something else either by art or by nature or bypotency.But we docause a bronze sphere to be, for we produce it from bronze and asphere; we induce the form into this particular matter, and the resultis a bronze sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general isgenerated, something must be generated from something; for that whichis generated will always have to be divisible, and be partly one thingand partly another; I mean partly matter and partly form.If then a sphere is the figurewhose circumference is everywhere equidistant from the center, part ofthis will be the medium in which that which we produce will becontained, and part will be in that medium; and the whole will be thething generated, as in the case of the bronze sphere. It is obvious,then, from what we have said, that the thing in the sense of form oressence is not generated, whereas the concrete whole which is calledafter it is generated; and that in everything that is generated matteris present, and one part is matter and the other form.
[20] Is there then somesphere besides the particular spheres, or some house besides thebricks? Surely no individual thing would ever have been generated ifform had existed thus independently.28 Form means "of such a kind"; it is not adefinite individual, but we produce or generate from the individualsomething "of such a kind"; and when it is generated it is anindividual "of such a kind."The whole individual, Callias orSocrates, corresponds to "this bronze sphere," but"man" and "animal" correspond to bronze sphere in general.
Obviously therefore the cause which consistsof the Forms (in the sense in which some speak of them, assuming thatthere are certain entities besides particulars), in respect at leastof generation and destruction, is useless; nor, for this reason at anyrate, should they be regarded as self-subsistent substances.Indeed in some cases it is evenobvious that that which generates is of the same kind as that which isgenerated—not however identical with it, nor numerically onewith it, but formally one—e.g. in natural productions (forman begets man), unless something happens contrary to nature, as whena horse sires a mule. And even these cases are similar; for that whichwould be common to both horse and ass, the genus immediately abovethem, has no name; but it would probably be both, just as the mule isboth.29 [1034a] [1]
Thus obviously there is no need to setup a form as a pattern (for we should have looked for Forms in thesecases especially, since living things are in a special sensesubstances); the thing which generates is sufficient to produce, andto be the cause of the form in the matter. The completed whole,such-and-such a form induced in this flesh and these bones, is Calliasor Socrates. And it isdifferent from that which generated it, because the matter isdifferent but identical in form, because the form isindivisible.
The question might be raised why somethings are generated both artificially andspontaneously—e.g. health—and others not; e.g. ahouse. The reason is that in some cases the matter—which isthe starting-point of the process in the production and generation ofartificial things, and in which some part of the result is alreadyexistent—is such that it can initiate its own motion, and inother cases it is not; and of the former kind some can initiate motionin a particular way, and some cannot. For many things can movethemselves, but not in a particular way, e.g. so as todance.It isimpossible, then, for any things whose matter is of this kind (e.g.stones) to be moved in this particular way except bysomething else; but in that particular way it ispossible. And it is so with fire.30 For this reason some things cannot existapart from the possessor of the art, and others can; [20] because the motion can be initiated bythose things which do not indeed possess the art, but can themselvesbe moved either by other things which do not possess the art, or bythe motion from the part of the product which pre-exists in them.31
It is clear also from what we have saidthat in a sense all artificial things are generated either fromsomething which bears the same name (as is the case with naturalobjects) or from a part of themselves which bears the same name asthemselves (e.g. a house from a house, inasmuch as it is generated bymind; for the art is the form), or from something which contains somepart; that is if the generation is not accidental; for the direct andindependent cause of the production is a part of theproduct.Heat in themotion produces heat in the body; and either this is health or a partof health, or a part of health or health accompanies it. And this iswhy heat is said to produce health, because it produces that of whichhealth is a concomitant and consequence. Therefore as essence is thestarting-point of everything in syllogisms (because syllogisms startfrom the "what" of a thing), so too generation proceeds fromit.
And it is the same with natural formations asit is with the products of art. For the seed produces just as do thosethings which function by art. It contains the form potentially, [1034b] [1] and that from which the seed comes hasin some sense the same name as the product (for we must not expectthat all should have the same name in the sense that "man" is producedby "man"—since woman is also produced by man); unless theproduct is a freak. This is why a mule is not produced by amule.
Those natural objects which are produced, likeartificial objects, spontaneously, are those whose matter can alsoinitiate for itself that motion which the seed initiates. Those whosematter cannot do this cannot be generated otherwise than by theirproper parents.
It is not only withreference to substance that our argument shows that the form is notgenerated; the same argument is common in its application to all theprimary divisions, i.e. quantity, quality and the othercategories.For justas the bronze sphere is generated, but not the sphere nor the bronze;and as in the case of bronze, if it is generated the form and matterare not (because they must always pre-exist), so it is too with the"what" and the quality and quantity and the other categoriessimilarly; for it is not the quality that is generated, but the woodof that quality; nor is it the size, but the wood or animal of thatsize.But apeculiarity of substance may be gathered from this: that some othersubstance must pre-exist in actuality which produces it; e.g. ananimal, if an animal is being generated; but a quality or quantityneed not pre-exist otherwise than potentially.
[20] Since adefinition is a formula, and every formula has parts; and since theformula is related to the thing in the same way as the part of theformula to the part of the thing, the question32 nowarises: Must the formula of the parts be contained in the formula ofthe whole, or not? It seems clear that it is so in some cases, but notin others.The formula ofthe circle does not include that of the segments, but the formula ofthe syllable includes that of the letters. And yet the circle isdivisible into its segments in just the same way as the syllable intoits letters.
Again, if the parts areprior to the whole, and the acute angle is part of the right angle,and the finger part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior tothe right angle, and the finger to the man.But it is considered that the latter areprior; for in the formula the parts are explained from them; and thewholes are prior also in virtue of their ability to existindependently. The truth probably is that "part" has several meanings,one of which is "that which measures in respect of quantity." However,let us dismiss this question and consider of what, in the sense ofparts, substance consists. [1035a] [1]
Ifthen matter, form, and the combination of the two are distinct, and ifboth matter and form and their combination are substance, there is onesense in which even matter may be called "part" of a thing; andanother in which it is not, but the only parts are those elements ofwhich the formula of the form consists. E.g., flesh is not a part ofconcavity, because flesh is the matter in which concavity is induced;but it is a part of snubness. And bronze is part of the statue as aconcrete whole, but not of the statue in the sense of form.We may speak of the form (orthe thing as having a form) as an individual thing, but we may neverso speak of that which is material by itself. This is why the formulaof the circle does not contain that of the segments, whereas theformula of the syllable does contain that of the letters; for theletters are parts of the formula of the form; they are not matter; butthe segments are parts in the sense of matter in which the form isinduced. They approximate, however, more closely to the form than doesthe bronze when roundness is engendered in bronze.But there is a sense in which not evenall the letters will be contained in the formula of the syllable; e.g.particular letters on wax33 or sounds in the air; forthese too are part of the syllable in the sense that they are itssensible matter.For evenif the line is divided and resolved into its halves, or if the man isresolved into bones and muscles and flesh, [20] it does not follow that they arecomposed of these as parts of their essence, but as their matter; andthese are parts of the concrete whole, but not of the form, or that towhich the formula refers. Hence they are not in theformulae.Accordingly in some cases the formula will include the formula ofsuch parts as the above, but in others it need not necessarily containtheir formula, unless it is the formula of the concrete object. It isfor this reason that some things are composed of parts in the sense ofprinciples into which they can be resolved, while others arenot.All thingswhich are concrete combinations of form and matter (e.g. "the snub" orthe bronze circle) can be resolved into form and matter, and thematter is a part of them; but such as are not concrete combinationswith matter, but are without matter—whose formulae refer tothe form only—cannot be resolved; either not at all, or atleast not in this way.Thus these material components are principles and parts of theconcrete objects, but they are neither parts nor principles of theform. For this reason the clay statue can be resolved into clay, andthe sphere into bronze, and Callias into flesh and bones, and thecircle too into segments, because it is something which is combinedwith matter. [1035b] [1] For we use the same name for theabsolute circle and for the particular circle, since there is nospecial name for the particular circles.
We have nowstated the truth; nevertheless let us recapitulate and state it moreclearly. All constituents which are parts of the formula, and intowhich the formula can be divided, are prior to theirwholes—either all or some of them. But the formula of theright angle is not divisible into the formula of an acute angle, butvice versa; since in defining the acute angle we use the right angle,because "the acute angle is less than a right angle."It is the same with thecircle and the semicircle; for the semicircle is defined by means ofthe circle. And the finger is defined by means of the whole body; fora finger is a particular kind of part of a man. Thus such parts as arematerial, and into which the whole is resolved as into matter, areposterior to the whole; but such as are parts in the sense of parts ofthe formula and of the essence as expressed in the formula, are prior;either all or some of them.And since the soul of animals (which is thesubstance of the living creature) is their substance in accordancewith the formula, and the form and essence of that particular kind ofbody (at least each part, if it is to be properly defined, will not bedefined apart from its function; and this will not belong to it apartfrom perception34); therefore the parts of the soul are prior, eitherall or some of them, to the concrete animal; and similarly in otherindividual cases. [20] But the body and its partsare posterior to this substance, and it is not the substance, but theconcrete whole, which is resolved into these parts as into matter.Therefore in one sense these parts are prior to the concrete whole,and in another not; for they cannot exist in separation. A fingercannot in every state be a part of a living animal; for the deadfinger has only the name in common with the living one.Some parts are contemporarywith the whole: such as are indispensable and in which the formula andthe essence are primarily present; e.g. the heart or perhaps thebrain,35 for it does not matterwhich of them is of this nature. But "man" and "horse" and terms whichare applied in this way to individuals, but universally, are notsubstance, but a kind of concrete whole composed of thisparticular formula and this particular matter regarded asuniversal. But individuallySocrates is already composed of ultimate matter; andsimilarly in all other cases.
A part, then, may be part ofthe form (by form I mean essence), or of the concrete whole composedof form and matter, or of the matter itself. But only the parts of theform are parts of the formula, and the formula refers to theuniversal; [1036a] [1] for "circle" is the same as "essence ofcircle," and "soul" the same as "essence of soul."But when we come to the concrete thing,e.g. this circle—which is a particular individual, eithersensible or intelligible (by intelligible circles I mean those ofmathematics,36 and by sensible those which are of bronzeor wood)—of these individuals there is nodefinition;weapprehend them by intelligence or perception; and when they havepassed from the sphere of actuality it is uncertain whether they existor not, but they are always spoken of and apprehended by the universalformula. But the matter is in itself unknowable. Some matter issensible and some intelligible; sensible, such as bronze and wood andall movable matter; intelligible, that which is present in sensiblethings not qua sensible, e.g. the objects ofmathematics.37
We have now discussed the case of the whole and part, and of priorand posterior. But we must answer the question, when we are askedwhich is prior—the right angle and circle and animal, orthat into which they are resolved and of which they are composed, i.e.their parts—by saying that neither isabsolutely prior.For if the soul also is theanimal or living thing, or the soul of the individual isthe individual, and "being a circle" is the circle, and"being a right angle" or the essence of the right angleis the right angle, then we must admit that the whole inone sense is posterior to the part in one sense: [20] e.g. to the parts in the formula andthe parts of a particular right angle(since both the material right angle of bronzeand the right angle included by individual lines are posterior totheir parts), but the immaterial angle is posterior to the parts inthe formula, but prior to the parts in the individual. We must notgive an unqualified answer. And if the soul is not the animal butsomething else, even so we must say that some wholes are prior andsome are not, as has been stated.
The questionnaturally presents itself, what sort of parts belong to the form andwhat sort belong not to it but to the concrete object. Yet if this isnot plain it is impossible to define the particular; because thedefinition refers to the universal and the form. Therefore if it isnot clear what kind of parts are material and what kind are not, theformula of the thing will not be clear either.In the case of things which can be seento be induced in specifically different materials, as, e.g., a circleis in bronze and stone and wood, it seems clear that these things, thebronze and the stone, are in no sense part of the essential substanceof the circle, because it is separable from them.As for things which are not visiblyseparable, there is no reason why the same should not apply to them;e.g., if all the circles that had ever been seen were bronze; [1036b] [1] for the bronze would be none the lessno part of the form, but it is difficult to separate it inthought.Forexample, the form of "man" is always manifested in flesh and bones andelements of this kind; then are these actually parts of the form andformula, or are they not so, but matter, though since the form is notinduced in other materials, we cannot separate it?Now since this seems to be possible,but it is not clear when, some thinkers38 aredoubtful even in the case of the circle and the triangle, consideringthat it is not proper to define them by lines and continuous space,but that all these are to the circle or triangle as flesh or bone isto man, and bronze or stone to the statue; and they reduce everythingto numbers, and say that the formula of "line" is the formula of2.And of theexponents of the Forms, some make 2 the Ideal line, and some the formof the line39;for they say that in some cases the form and that of which it is theform, e.g. 2 and the form of 2, are the same; but in the case of"line" this is no longer so.It follows, then, that there is one form ofmany things whose form is clearly different (a consequence whichconfronted the Pythagoreans too40), and thatit is possible to make one supreme Form of everything, and not toregard the rest as forms. [20] Inthis way, however, all things would be one.
Now wehave stated that the question of definitions involves some difficulty,and have shown why this is so. Hence to reduce everything in this wayand to dispose of the matter is going too far; for some things arepresumably a particular form in particular matter, or particularthings in a particular state.And the analogy in the case of the livingthing which the youngerSocrates41 used to state is not a good one; for itleads one away from the truth, and makes one suppose that it ispossible for a man to exist without his parts, as a circle doeswithout the bronze. But the case is not similar; for the animal issensible and cannot be defined without motion, and hence not unlessits parts are in some definite condition;for it is not the hand in anycondition that is a part of a man, but only when it can perform itsfunction, and so has life in it. Without life in it it is not apart.
And with respect tomathematical objects, why are the formulae of the parts not parts ofthe formulae of the whole; e.g., why are the formulae of thesemicircles not parts of the formula of the circle? for they are notsensible.Probablythis makes no difference; because there will be matter even of somethings which are not sensible. [1037a] [1] Indeed there will bematter in some sense in everything which is not essence or formconsidered independently, but a particular thing. Thus the semicircleswill be parts not of the universal circle but of the particularcircles, as we said before42—forsome matter is sensible, and some intelligible.It is clear also that the soul is theprimary substance, and the body matter; and "man" or "animal" is thecombination of both taken universally. And "Socrates" or "Coriscus" has adouble sense, that is if the soul too can be calledSocrates (for bySocrates some mean the soul andsome the concrete person); but ifSocrates means simply this soul andthis body, the individual is composed similarly tothe universal.
Whether there is some other materialcomponent of these substances besides their matter, and whether weshould look for some further substance in them, such as numbers orsomething of that kind, must be considered later.43 Itis with a view to this that we are trying to determine the nature ofsensible substances, since in a sense the study of sensible substancesbelongs to physics or secondary philosophy; for the physicist mustknow not only about the matter, but also about the substance accordingto the formula; this is even more essential.And in the case of definitions, in whatsense the elements in the formula are parts of the definition, and whythe definition is one formula (for the thing is clearly one, [20] but in virtue of what is it one,seeing that it has parts?); this must be considered later.44
Wehave stated, then, in a general account which covers all cases, whatessence is, and how it is independent; and why the formula of theessence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, whilethat of others does not; and we have shown that the material parts ofa thing cannot be present in the formula of the substance (since theyare not even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concretesubstance; and of this in one sense there is a formula, and in anothersense there is not.Thereis no formula involving the matter, for this is indeterminate; butthere is a formula in accordance with the primary substance, e.g., inthe case of a man, the formula of the soul; because the substance isthe indwelling form, of which and of the matter the so called concretesubstance is composed. E.g., concavity is such a form, since from thisand "nose" is derived "snub nose" and "snubness"—for "nose"will be present twice over in these expressions);but in the concrete substance, e.g.snub nose or Callias, matter will be present too.45 Wehave stated also that the essence and the individual are in some casesthe same, [1037b] [1] as in the case of the primarysubstances; e.g. crookedness and "essence of crookedness," if this isprimary.By primaryI mean that which does not imply the presence of something insomething else as a material substrate. But such things as arematerial or are compounded with matter are not the same as theiressence; not even if they are accidentally one, e.g.Socrates and "cultured"; for theseare only accidentally the same.
Now let us firstdeal with definition, in so far as it has not been dealt with in the
Analytics; for the problem stated there46 has a bearing upon ourdiscussion of substance. The problem I mean is this: what constitutesthe unity of the thing of which we say that the formula is adefinition? E.g., in the case of man, "two-footed animal"; for let ustake this as the formula of "man."Why, then, is this a unity and not aplurality, "animal" and "two-footed"? For in the case of "man" and"white" we have a plurality when the latter does not refer to theformer, but a unity when it does refer to it, and the subject, "man,"has an attribute; for then they become a unity and we have "the whiteman."But in thecase before us one term does not partake of the other; the genus isnot considered to partake of its differentiae, for then the same thingwould be partaking simultaneously of contraries, [20] since the differentiae by which thegenus is distinguished are contrary. And even if it does partake ofthem, the same argument applies, since the differentiae are many; e.g.terrestrial, two-footed, wingless.Why is it that these are a unity and not aplurality? Not because they are present in one genus, for in that caseall the differentiae of the genus will form a unity. But all theelements in the definition must form a unity, because the definitionis a kind of formula which is one and defines substance, so that itmust be a formula of one particular thing; because the substancedenotes one thing and an individual, as we say.
We must first47 examinedefinitions which are reached by the process of division.For there is nothing else inthe definition but the primary genus and the differentiae; the othergenera consist of the primary genus together with the differentiaewhich are taken with it. E.g., the primary genus is "animal"; the nextbelow it, "two-footed animal"; and again, "two-footed winglessanimal"; and similarly also if the expression contains more termsstill. [1038a] [1] In general it does not matter whether itcontains many or few terms, nor, therefore, whether it contains few ortwo. Of the two one is differentia and the other genus; e.g., in"two-footed animal" "animal" is genus, and the other termdifferentia.If,then, the genus absolutely does not exist apart from the species whichit includes, or if it exists, but only as matter (for speech is genusand matter, and the differentiae make the species, i.e. the letters,out of it), obviously the definition is the formula composed of thedifferentiae.
But further we must also divide by thedifferentia of the differentia. E.g., "having feet" is a differentiaof "animal"; then in turn we must discover the differentia of "animalhaving feet" qua "having feet." Accordingly weshould not say that of "that which has feet" one kind is winged andanother wingless, (that is if we are to speak correctly; if we saythis it will be through incapability), but only that one kind iscloven-footed and another not; because these are differentiae of"foot," since cloven-footedness is a kind of footedness.And thus we tend always toprogress until we come to the species which contain no differentiae.At this point there will be just as many species of foot as there aredifferentiae, and the kinds of animals having feet will be equal innumber to the differentiae. Then, if this is so, [20] obviously the ultimate differentia willbe the substance and definition of the thing, since we need not statethe same things more than once in definitions, because this issuperfluous.However, it does happen; for when we say "footed two-footed animal"we have simply said "animal having feet, having two feet." And if wedivide this by its proper division, we shall be stating the same thingseveral times, as many times as there are differentiae.
If, then, we keep on taking a differentia of a differentia, one ofthem, the last, will be the form and the substance. But if we proceedwith reference to accidental qualities—e.g. if we divide"that which has feet" into white and black—there will be asmany differentiae as there are divisions. It is therefore obvious thatthe definition is the formula derived from the differentiae, andstrictly speaking from the last of them.This will be clear if we change the order ofsuch definitions, e.g. that of man, saying "two-footed footed animal";for "footed" is superfluous when we have already said "two-footed."But there is no question of order in the substance; for how are we tothink of one part as posterior and the other prior?
With regard, then, to definitions by division, letthis suffice as a preliminary statement of their nature. [1038b] [1]
Since the subject of our inquiry issubstance, let us return to it. Just as the substrate and the essenceand the combination of these are called substance, so too is theuniversal. With two of these we have already dealt, i.e. with theessence48 and the substrate49; of the latter we have said that itunderlies in two senses—either being an individual thing (asthe animal underlies its attributes), or as matter underlies theactuality.Theuniversal also is thought by some50 to be in the truest sensea cause and a principle. Let us therefore proceed to discuss thisquestion too; for it seems impossible that any universal term can besubstance.
First, the substance ofan individual is the substance which is peculiar to it and belongs tonothing else; whereas the universal is common; for by universal wemean that which by nature appertains to several things.Of what particular, then, willthe universal be the substance? Either of all or of none. But itcannot be the substance of all; while, if it is to be the substance ofone, the rest also will be that one; because things whose substance isone have also one essence and are themselves one.
Again, substance means that which is not predicatedof a subject, whereas the universal is always predicated of somesubject.
But perhaps although theuniversal cannot be substance in the sense that essence is, it can bepresent in the essence, as "animal" can be present in "man" and"horse."Thenclearly there is in some sense a formula of the universal. It makes nodifference [20] even ifthere is not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for theuniversal will be none the less the substance of something; e.g.,"man" will be the substance of the man in whom it is present. Thus thesame thing will happen again51; e.g. "animal" will be the substance of that in which itis present as peculiar to it.
Again, it is impossible andabsurd that the individual or substance, if it is composed ofanything, should be composed not of substances nor of the individual,but of a quality; for then non-substance or quality will be prior tosubstance or the individual. Which is impossible; for neither informula nor in time nor in generation can the affections of substancebe prior to the substance, since then they would beseparable.
Again, a substance will be present in"Socrates," who is asubstance; so that it will be the substance of two things. And ingeneral it follows that if "man" and all terms used in this way aresubstance, none of the elements in the formula is the substance ofanything, nor can it exist apart from the species or in anything else;I mean, e.g., that neither "animal" nor any other element of theformula can exist apart from the particular species.
If welook at the question from this standpoint it is obvious that nouniversal attribute is substance; and it is also clear from the factthat none of the common predicates means "so-and-so," [1039a] [1] but "such and-such." Otherwise amongst many otherawkward consequences we have the "third man."52
Again, it is clear in this waytoo. Substance can not consist of substances actually present in it;for that which is actually two can never be actually one, whereas ifit is potentially two it can be one. E.g., the double consists of twohalves—that is, potentially; for the actualization separatesthe halves.Thus ifsubstance is one, it cannot consist of substances present in it evenin this sense, as Democritus rightly observes; he says that it isimpossible for two to come from one, or one from two, because heidentifies substance with the atoms.53Clearly then the same will also hold good in the case of number(assuming that number is a composition of units, as it is said to beby some); because either 2 is not 1, or there is notactually a unit in it.
The consequenceinvolves a difficulty; for if no substance can consist of universals,because they mean "of such a kind," and not a particular thing; and ifno substance can be actually composed of substances, every substancewill be incomposite, and so there will be no formula of anysubstance.But inpoint of fact it is universally held, and has been previouslystated,54 [20] that substance is the only or chiefsubject of definition; but on this showing there is no definition evenof substance. Then there can be no definition of anything; or ratherin a sense there can, and in a sense cannot. What this means will beclearer from what follows later.55
From these same considerationsit is clear also what consequence follows for those who maintain thatthe Forms are substances and separable, and who at the same time makethe species consist of the genus and the differentiae. If there areForms, and if "animal" is present in the man and the horse, it iseither numerically one and the same with them, or not.(In formula they are clearlyone; for in each case the speaker will enunciate the same formula.)If, then, there is in some sense an Absolute Man, who is an individualand exists separately, then the constituents, e.g. "animal" and"two-footed," must have an individual meaning and be separable andsubstances. Hence there must be an Absolute Animal too.
(i) Then if the "animal" which is in the horse and the man is oneand the same, as you are one and the same with yourself, [1039b] [1] how can the one which in things that existseparately be one, and why should not this "animal" also be separatedfrom itself? Again, if it is to partake of "two-footed" and of"many-footed," an impossibility follows; for contrary attributes willbelong to it although it is one and individual.But if it does not, in what sense is itthat one calls an animal "two-footed" or "terrestrial"? Perhaps theterms are "combined" and "in contact" or "mixed." But all theseexpressions are absurd.
(2) "But thereis a different 'animal' in each species." Then there will bepractically an infinity of things of which "animal" is the substance,since it is not in an accidental sense that "man" is derived from"animal."Again, theAbsolute Animal will be a plurality. For (a) the "animal" in eachspecies will be the substance of that species, since the species iscalled after it and no other thing. Otherwise "man" would be derivedfrom that other thing, which would be the genus of "man." (b) Further,all the constituents of "man" will be Ideas. Then, since nothing canbe the Idea of one thing and the substance of another (for this isimpossible),eachand every "animal" in the various species will be the AbsoluteAnimal.
Further, from what willthese Forms be derived, and how can they be derived from the AbsoluteAnimal? Or how can "the animal," whose very essence is "animal," existapart from the Absolute Animal? And further, in the case of sensiblethings both these and still more absurd consequences follow. If, then,these consequences are impossible, clearly there are not Forms ofsensible things in the sense in which some hold that thereare.
[20] Sincesubstance is of two kinds, the concrete thing and the formula (I meanthat one kind of substance is the formula in combination with thematter, and the other is the formula in its full sense), substances inthe former sense admit of destruction, for they also admit ofgeneration. But the formula does not admit of destruction in the sensethat it is ever being destroyed, since neither does it soadmit of generation (for the essence of house is not generated, butonly the essence of this house); formulaeare , and are not, independently ofgeneration and destruction; for it has been shown56 that no one either generates orcreates them.For thisreason also there is no definition or demonstration of particularsensible substances, because they contain matter whose nature is suchthat it can both exist and not exist. Hence all the individualinstances of them are perishable.If, then, the demonstration and definition ofnecessary truths requires scientific knowledge, and if, just asknowledge cannot be sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance (it isopinion that is of this nature), so too demonstration and definitioncannot vary (it is opinion that is concerned with that which can beotherwise than it is)— [1040a] [1] then clearly therecan be neither definition nor demonstration of individual sensiblesubstances.For (a)things which perish are obscure to those who have knowledge of themwhen they are removed from the sphere of their perception, and (b)even though their formulae are preserved in the soul, there will nolonger be either definition or demonstration of them. Therefore incases relating to definition, when we are trying to define anyindividual, we must not fail to realize that our definition may alwaysbe upset; because it is impossible to define these things.
Nor, indeed, can any Idea be defined; for the Idea is an individual,as they say, and separable; and the formula must consist of words, andthe man who is defining must not coin a word, because it would not becomprehensible. But the words which are in use are common to all thethings which they denote; and so they must necessarily apply tosomething else as well. E.g., if a man were to define you, he wouldsay that you are an animal which is lean or white or has some otherattribute, which will apply to something else as well.And if it should be said thatthere is no reason why all the attributes separately should not belongto several things, and yet in combination belong to this alone, wemust reply, (1.) that they also belong to both the elements; e.g.,"two-footed animal" belongs both to "animal" and to "two-footed" (andin the case of eternal elements this is even necessarily so; sincethey are prior to the compound, and parts of it.Indeed they are also separable, if theterm "man" is separable—for either neither can be separable,or both are so. [20] If neither,the genus will not exist apart from the species, or if it is so toexist, so will the differentia); (2.) that "animal" and "two-footed"are prior in being to "two-footed animal," and that which is prior tosomething else is not destroyed together with it.
Again,if the Ideas are composed of Ideas (for constituents are lesscomposite than that which they compose), still the elements of whichthe Idea is composed (e.g. "animal" and "two-footed") will have to bepredicated of many particulars. Otherwise, how can they be known? Forthere would be an Idea which cannot be predicated of more than onething. But this is not considered possible; every Idea is thought toadmit of participation.
Thus, as we have said,57 the impossibility ofdefining individuals is hard to realize when we are dealing witheternal entities, especially in the case of such as are unique, e.g.the sun and moon. For people go wrong not only by including in thedefinition attributes on whose removal it will still besun—e.g., "that which goes round the earth," or"night-hidden " (for they suppose that if it stops or becomesvisible58 it will no longer be sun; but it is absurd that thisshould be so, since "the sun "denotes a definitesubstance)—they also mention attributes which may apply tosomething else; e.g., if another thing with those attributes comesinto being, clearly it will be a sun. The formula, then, is general; [1040b] [1] but the sun was supposed to be anindividual, like Cleon orSocrates.Why does not one of the exponents of the Ideasproduce a definition of them? If they were to try, it would becomeobvious that what we have just said is true.
It isobvious that even of those things which are thought to be substancesthe majority are potentialities; both the parts of living things (fornone of them has a separate substantial existence; and when they areseparated, although they still exist, they exist as matter), andearth, fire and air; for none of these is one thing—they are a mere aggregate before they are digested and someone thing is generated from them.It might be supposed very reasonably that theparts of living things and the corresponding parts of their vitalprinciple are both, i.e. exist both actually and potentially, becausethey contain principles of motion derived from something in theirjoints; and hence some animals59 live even when they aredivided. Nevertheless it is only potentially that all of them willexist when they are one and continuous by nature and not by force orconcretion; for this sort of thing is malformation.60
And since "unity" has the samevariety of senses as "being," and the substance of Unity is one, andthings whose substance is numerically one are numerically one,evidently neither Unity nor Being can be the substance of things, justas neither "being an element" or "principle" can be thesubstance; [20] but we askwhat the principle is so that we may refer to something moreintelligible.61Now of these concepts Beingand Unity are more nearly substance than are principle, element andcause; but not even the former are quite substance, since nothing elsethat is common is substance; for substance belongs to nothing exceptit*elf and that which contains it and of which it is thesubstance.Again,Unity cannot exist in many places at the same time, but that which iscommon is present in many things at the same time. Hence it is clearthat no universal exists in separation apart from its particulars. Theexponents of the Forms are partly right in their account when theymake the Forms separate; that is, if the Forms are substances, butthey are also partly wrong, since by "Form" they mean the"one-over-many."62The reason for this is that they cannot explain what are theimperishable substances of this kind which exist besides particularsensible substances; so they make them the same in kind as perishablethings (for these we know); i.e., they make "Ideal Man" and "IdealHorse," adding the word "Ideal" to the names of sensiblethings.However, Ipresume that even if we had never seen the stars, [1041a] [1] nonethe less there would be eternal substances besides those which weknew; and so in the present case even if we cannot apprehend what theyare, still there must be eternal substances of some kind.
It is clear, then, both that no universalterm is substance and that no substance is composed ofsubstances.
As for what and what sort of thing wemean by substance, let us explain this by making, as it were, anotherfresh start. Perhaps in this way we shall also obtain some light uponthat kind of substance which exists in separation from sensiblesubstances. Since, then, substance is a kind of principle and cause,we had better pursue our inquiry from this point.
Now when we ask why a thing is, it is always in thesense "why does A belong to B?"To ask why the cultured man is a cultured manis to ask either, as we have said, why the man is cultured, orsomething else. Now to ask why a thing is itself is no question;because when we ask the reason of a thing the fact must first beevident; e.g., that the moon suffers eclipse;and "because it is itself" is the oneexplanation and reason which applies to all questions such as "why isman man?" or "why is the cultured person cultured?" (unless one wereto say that each thing is indivisible from itself, and that this iswhat "being one" really means); [20] but this, besides being a general answer, is asummary one.63 We may, however, ask why a man isan animal of such-and-such a kind.It is clear, then, that we are not asking whyhe who is a man is a man; therefore we are asking why A, which ispredicated of B, belongs to B. (The fact that A does belong to B mustbe evident, for if this is not so, the question is pointless.) E.g.,"Why does it thunder?" means "why is a noise produced in the clouds?"for the true form of the question is one thing predicated in this wayof another.Or again, "whyare these things, e.g. bricks and stones, a house?" Clearly then weare inquiring for the cause (i.e., to speak abstractly, the essence);which is in the case of some things, e.g. house or bed, theend , and in others the prime mover—for thisalso is a cause. We look for the latter kind of cause in the case ofgeneration and destruction, but for the former also in the case ofexistence.
What we are now looking for is mostobscure when one term is not predicated of another; [1041b] [1] e.g. when we inquire what man is; because theexpression is a simple one not analyzed into subject and attributes.We must make the question articulate before we ask it; otherwise weget something which shares the nature of a pointless and of a definitequestion.Now sincewe must know that the fact actually exists, it is surely clear thatthe question is "why is the matter so-and-so?" e.g. "whyare these materials a house?" Because the essence of house is presentin them. And this matter, or the body containing this particular form,is man. Thus what we are seeking is the cause (i.e. the form) invirtue of which the matter is a definite thing; and this is thesubstance of the thing.
Clearly then inthe case of simple entities64 inquiry and explanation are impossible; insuch cases there is a different mode of inquiry.
Nowsince that which is composed of something in such a way that the wholeis a unity; not as an aggregate is a unity, but as a syllable is65—the syllable is not the letters, noris BA the same as B and A; nor is flesh fire and earth; because afterdissolution the compounds, e.g. flesh or the syllable, no longerexist; but the letters exist, and so do fire and earth.Therefore the syllable is someparticular thing; not merely the letters, vowel and consonant, butsomething else besides. And flesh is not merely fire and earth, or hotand cold, but something else besides.Since then this something else must be eitheran element or composed of elements, [20] (a) if it is an element, the same argument appliesagain; for flesh will be composed of this and fire andearth, and again of another element, so that there will be an infiniteregression. And (b) if it is composed of elements, clearly it iscomposed not of one (otherwise it will itself be that element) but ofseveral; so that we shall use the same argument in this case as aboutthe flesh or the syllable.It would seem, however, that this "something else" is something thatis not an element, but is the cause that this matter isflesh and that matter a syllable, and similarly in othercases.And this isthe substance of each thing, for it is the primary cause of itsexistence. And since, although some things are not substances, allsubstances are constituted in accordance with and by nature, substancewould seem to be this "nature," which is not an element but aprinciple.66 Anelement is that which is present as matter in a thing, and into whichthe thing is divided; e.g., A and B are the elements of thesyllable.
